18.    EUROPE, NATO, THE BALKANS AND RUSSIA

18.1   If the end of the cold war appeared to reinvigorate the original vision of the United Nations, it cast doubts on the utility of NATO. The alliance formed in 1949 to provide a collective response to the Soviet takeover of eastern Europe would seem to have lost its raison d'etre with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of its adversary, the Warsaw Pact. That this did not happen may be ascribed to:

• Central and eastern Europe: western Europeans and North Americans might have thought that the cold war had ended, but for the countries in central and eastern Europe which had been behind the iron curtain, admission to NATO was still of value. And they saw it as underpinning a new political order in which their armed forces would operate according to the norms of liberal democracy.

• The Balkans: despite much enthusiasm for a European defence identity independent of the United States, the Europeans found that they did not collectively have the military capability to stamp out Balkan brushfires.

• Europe: although NATO had been created to counter the Soviet threat, it had also served as a vehicle for managing relations between the European nations, as had other post-war European institutions, such as the European Economic Community, now the European Union. The fact that war between France and Germany is now inconceivable is extraordinary in the context of previous centuries of European history. NATO has played a crucial role in directing military energies to outward and collective ends, reducing if not eliminating the likelihood that European armies could ever turn their guns on each other.

18.2   Although it is conceivable that some of the purposes of NATO could be achieved without the US, the majority of Europeans recognise that the alliance's strength lies in the US connection and the security guarantee it provides. As a multilateral defence pact embracing 19 countries NATO is unique. Its size and composition mean that it will continue to benchmark standards in military training and materiel for non-NATO forces, including in UN operations.

18.3   NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. At its 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999 all NATO members affirmed the unique contribution of nuclear weapons to the alliance's security. France and the United Kingdom retain their own nuclear forces, which, with their permanent memberships of the UN Security Council, they see as central to their conception of themselves as substantial powers with extra-European roles.

18.4   Within NATO, conventional capabilities will increase in importance relative to nuclear forces as the US continues its development of RMA. Allied doctrine has always stressed the importance of interoperability between forces and this emphasis will continue. But most allied forces will be unable to keep up with advances across the whole spectrum of US capabilities and they will increasingly have to make decisions as to what part of their force structure need to be modernised to keep up with US capabilities.

18.5   That may make it even more difficult for the European members of NATO to put together advanced forces able to operate independently of the US. But they would still be able to carry out conventional military operations at a lower level, and some of the advanced technologies made available by RMA would enable them to do so more effectively. These developments are relevant to how far the recently agreed European Strategic Defence Identity (EDSI) will be able to proceed.

18.6   There have been differences between members on how far "out of area" NATO's role should extend. Many Europeans do not want to find themselves becoming an instrument of US policy in for example the Gulf. Individual NATO countries will continue to participate alongside the US beyond Europe but the Alliance itself will not deploy so far afield. The strategic concept agreed in 1999 reflects this balance.

18.7   There is also concern about NATO acting without explicit United Nations authorisation, as it found itself doing in Kosovo. While this may not be an immediate issue, the reverberations of the bombing of Belgrade, including the hostility engendered in Russia and China, were cautionary. But nor should the reaction be overstated. China and Russia did not block the post-bombing settlement in Kosovo.

18.8   Russia is no longer an enemy of NATO but nor will it become an ally in the foreseeable future; including Russia within NATO would destroy the alliance's balance. For its part Russia is suspicious of NATO. While it does not want to join NATO it also does not want NATO on its borders; and it is a reminder of Russia's loss of influence. Adapting the arrangements between Russia and NATO (and the EU) so they better meet the needs of both sides will be a challenge.

18.9   Russia's foreign and security policy cannot escape its economic weakness. Broad recognition in Moscow that reversing the economic decline is a foreign policy priority implies that Russia will wish to continue to engage with the international economic community. Reduced defence spending in the last ten years has greatly reduced the capabilities of Russia's armed forces to deploy effectively abroad. And the weakness of the conventional forces has compelled it to place greater reliance on its strategic nuclear forces (and to reconsider the role of tactical nuclear weapons).

18.10   Despite Russia's Pacific coastline and its membership of APEC, Asia is not a top strategic priority for Russia. US dominance gives China and Russia some commonality of interest but there is limited mutual attraction between them otherwise, either economic or political. The most significant strand in the relationship is probably Russia's availability as a source of defence hardware and technology and possibly, in time, oil and gas. Longstanding defence relations between Russia and India continue.

18.11   We judge that NATO will remain an effective security alliance, binding the US and Canada to Europe and the Europeans to each other. NATO will globally benchmark standards in military training and materiel. Other Europeans, whether members or not, will look to it for security. The Balkans will remain a region of engagement for NATO. Russia will be an unpredictable partner, but only if its economy revives significantly could it be a serious challenge. This is not likely within the next 20 years: and were the economy robust enough to fund a much stronger military its interests would even more lie in co-operation rather than confrontation. Russia will remain focussed on its relations with Europe and the US. Asia will take second place.

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