17.    THE UNITED STATES

17.1   The US remains what it has been since the end of World War II, the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world. With its nuclear capabilities, its carrier fleets, its embrace of the most sophisticated military technology, and a well developed industrial base its strategic dominance is unassailable. But US preeminence rests on more than just military power. The management of the global economy revolves around institutions based in Washington and New York. The US generates about 30% of global output. It is the largest producer and consumer of English-language information and entertainment. New technologies, such as the internet, are almost invariably seeded in the vast American market. The US is a favoured destination for thousands of refugees and emigrants. And its constant rebuilding and rethinking of its society is itself a strength.

17.2   Since 1947 in Europe and 1950 in Asia the United States has committed itself to an international path, judging that its own national interests were threatened by communist advances in southeastern Europe and Korea respectively, and that it was required to commit its own resources, in cooperation with like-minded countries, to deter those threats. All US presidents since Truman, whatever their campaign rhetoric in advance of taking office, have been convinced that this international policy benefits the US, have largely maintained that overall direction, and have usually been supported by the electorate in doing so (Vietnam is the major exception). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989/91 presented the US with a dilemma. Despite the change in strategic circumstance, and a number of voices calling for the United States to adopt a more self-contained or unilateral policy, the United States has remained outward oriented. The case for international engagement remained clear to Washington, but there is now no single focus around which policy can cohere. Instead there are a number of interwoven strands, some of which conflict with one another.

• Preserving America's strategic superiority, including by acting forcefully to deal with terrorists and with threats from those armed with weapons of mass destruction and/or missiles.

• Expanding the number of countries in which democratic governments and liberal economic policies prevail. This approach was inspired by the collapse of communist governments in eastern Europe, the end of apartheid and the end of military governments in Latin America, and more recently in Indonesia. It underpins US policies on human rights.

• Quarantining "rogue" states - North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and the like.

• Responding to transnational threats - organised crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration, piracy.

• Making the world a good and safe place for Americans to do business.

17.3   These elements are likely to constitute the principal ingredients of US foreign policy for the next president.

17.4   The US does not achieve these goals on its own. Militarily the US faces the possibility of overstretch and politically it seeks support for its actions from like-minded countries. The US co-operates with countries all over the globe in a variety of ways. But crucial to its strategy is its close links with the other major nodes of the global economy - Europe and Japan. We judge that America's key international partnerships - with the European members of NATO and with Japan - will remain in good shape. Both have been reaffirmed since the end of the cold war, with recognition that there are sufficient interests in common to warrant a continuing commitment to collective security. Although there are built-in tensions in these relationships we do not think that they will undermine those fundamental commitments.

17.5   The United States sees its fights against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as a global mission and will look for international support from like-minded countries in its efforts.

17.6   The United States is also at the centre of a host of other key international groupings. The most important of these is the G7 group of industrialised economies - the G8 when expanded (for political and security issues) to include Russia. Were China to be added it could diminish the importance of the APEC leaders summit for the G8 members (US, Canada, Russia and Japan) as this is the only occasion on which they regularly meet China. Regardless, there is an increasing tendency for many important international issues to be discussed first amongst the majors. Links into the G7 or associated groupings will remain important for New Zealand.

17.7   In most international organisations the United States is an indispensable member. While many countries are selective about the extent to which they protect their interests through multilateral institutions, US agnosticism in this respect carries much more impact. The UN, the WTO and the international financial institutions are not able to work effectively if the US distances itself from them. But nor can they work if the US simply imposes its will

17.8   United States armed forces are in the process of developing a new concept of warfare. This is so radical that it has commonly come to be called a revolution in military affairs (shortened to RMA). It combines the innovative application of emerging technologies with major changes in military doctrine and operational concepts. The result is expected to be a quantum leap in US conventional military capabilities. Under it, US armed forces would have the capability to overwhelm an enemy by striking targets with precision at long range, regardless of distance from base, target size, terrain or weather. Elements have already been demonstrated with some effect in the 1991 Gulf War, Operation Desert Fox in 1998 and the NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999.

17.9   A related concept that will become increasingly important is information warfare (IW): the use of computers remotely to attack and undermine an adversary's economy, infra-structure and national defences by disrupting or destroying the computerised control systems on which they increasingly rely. Unlike the RMA but like WMD, IW may become important as a technique that weaker countries may be able to use to attack adversaries that are much stronger in conventional military terms. Under some circumstances, a country attacked using IW might not realise for some time that an attack was under way: the effects might appear to be due to local failures of utilities or infrastructure.

17.10   American strategic superiority will be asserted in other ways:

• US nuclear capability remains central to US national security. Whatever approach the US takes to its commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty so long as there are other nuclear powers and a threat of nuclear or WMD proliferation, it will maintain a nuclear arsenal.

• There is strong support in the US for the development of missile defences against the threat from "rogue" states such as North Korea. While not intended to unpick the structure of arms control agreements reached during the cold war, such a development may be very destabilising, particularly in Asia.

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