15.    THE UNITED NATIONS

15.1   The United Nations has to operate with and amongst the major powers. There is a natural tension between US predominance in world affairs, and resistance to this from the other major powers and the international community as a whole. This does not normally produce the gridlock which was characteristic of the cold war. But 'multipolarity' has been favoured by those (eg France, Russia and China) who in varying degrees wish to see the world organised in a way which gives them more influence.

15.2   Nevertheless the UN lives up to its founders vision as the international organisation with universal membership and a universal mandate. The diversity of the membership means that the UN finds it difficult to respond quickly to changing events. But its status as the indispensable source of legitimacy in international affairs is probably stronger now than at any previous time, and despite procedural handicaps, it has many achievements to its credit.

15.3   The UN is able to be more active, but in the execution of its mission it is challenged on a number of fronts.

• There is no agreement on when the UN should act and when it should not. In part this debate reflects the inherent tension between international collective action and the charter prohibition on intervening in the domestic affairs of a member state. In part it reflects the extent to which the major powers have a national interest in being involved in any given conflict. The failure to act in Rwanda, and action without UN authorisation in Kosovo, reveal the political limits on the UN and weaken the UN's system of collective security.

• If and when it is decided to act, there is no agreement on what enforcement mechanism to use. The high water mark of UN action in the early 1990s (especially Bosnia and Somalia) has left scars. Many came to believe that the UN should not "go to war" but should confine itself to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The US has been sceptical of 'blue helmet' operations, even if its own troops are not involved, although it does prefer UN authorisation of enforcement action. But there are risks that too great a resort to UN authorised coalitions will confine participation in collective security actions to the smaller number of countries who can afford to supply, fund and equip the appropriate forces themselves. It also would reduce the likelihood of the UN being authorised to assist with conflicts in which major powers have no interest.

• The other weapon in the hands of the UN, sanctions, are increasingly criticised for being unfair (civilian populations bear the brunt) or ineffective (eg Saddam Hussein has still not complied with UN resolutions). But the UN would be weakened if it had no enforcement mechanism short of war.

• If the UN is to be an administering authority - as in Kosovo, East Timor - its capacity in this area needs to be strengthened.

• The Security Council no longer reflects the balance of power in the world or the diversity of the UN's membership. But efforts to expand its membership and reform its procedures (including the exercise of the veto) are making little headway against the entrenched positions of many member states.

• US conditioning of the payment of its arrears poses an acute dilemma for the other members: accept the US deal and thereby set a precedent that unilateral decisions on international obligations are acceptable; or reject, and run the risk that the US will disengage from the UN.

• Arrears owed to the peacekeeping account impede widespread participation in peacekeeping because of the attendant delays in reimbursing contributors.

• There are anomalies in the current scale of assessments. Too great a mismatch between the scale and the outside world is unhealthy. But it is extremely difficult to reach agreement on a reform of the scale.

• Debates in the General Assembly on a range of issues, including development, human rights and the environment, are often characterised by the espousal of fixed positions in a North/South mould, and as a result do not produce convincing outcomes.

• Many developing countries object to good governance or human rights being used to justify intrusion into what they regard as their internal affairs.

15.4   But there are many areas where progress has been made. The integration of human rights in peace-building operations is an important and constructive development. The establishment of the two international tribunals for the prosecution of crimes against humanity (Yugoslavia and Rwanda) has set important precedents.

15.5   Inter-state conflict is increasingly rare but there are international frontiers where the UN has assisted and could be called upon to do so in the future: the borders of Israel and Kashmir are two examples. The same could quite likely apply to a managed reunification of Korea.

15.6   Conflict resulting from communal (linguistic, racial or religious) tensions within a state have become common where previously existing and often rigid political structures have broken down (the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Africa). The international community may be drawn into such conflicts because they are seen to pose a wider threat to international peace and security, because of the humanitarian consequences (especially if there is extensive media coverage), or by an invitation from one of the parties. There is no international consensus on when and how to intervene, but regardless the UN (and regional organisations) will continue to be called upon in such circumstances.

15.7   If member states cannot agree on reform proposals (whether of the Security Council or of the financial system) the UN will under perform - to the disadvantage of all. Decisions about intervention and the deployment of UN operations are inherently political and will continue to be taken in an ad hoc fashion. The mandate and composition of peacekeeping operations will vary, but there will continue to be a requirement for such operations, and countries such as New Zealand, with a commitment to UN principles and reliable armed forces, will be in the front line of states asked to contribute.

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