11.    JAPAN

11.1   Although the Japanese political landscape changed considerably in the 1990s, the key elements of Japan's security policy which have been in place since 1951 have not - alliance with the United States, the 'peace' constitution, and the maintenance of self defence forces. We judge that these components will remain in place for the time being. But opinion in favour of a more active security role for Japan, including amendment of the constitution, is becoming more mainstream. While the collapse of the Soviet Union removed what Japan had long seen as its major threat (although without leading to a resolution of the northern territories issue) Japan still views the overall security situation in its region as opaque. The primary cause of this uncertainty is North Korea. The overflight of a North Korean missile in August 1998 startled Japan and acted as a catalyst to accelerated development of a reconnaissance satellite project and theatre missile defence research. Japan has longer term concerns about China's programme of military modernisation.

11.2   Apart from the direct security benefits, Japan's alliance with the US and the associated constitutional restraints allow it to maintain a defence capability without offending Japanese public opinion and in a manner which is reassuring to Japan's neighbours. Some regional concern emerged when, in 1996, agreement was reached on guidelines drawn up at US instigation to determine the circumstances in which Japan could offer non-combat/rear support to US forces in the event of a contingency in "areas surrounding Japan". This was quickly interpreted by China as meaning that Japan would aid the US in the event of a confrontation over Taiwan. But the real import of Tokyo's revamped role will remain unknown until a situation arises in which the guidelines come into play.

11.3   Japan is seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It has been pursuing a more active approach to regional security, enhancing the role of its self-defence forces (especially in non-combat roles abroad) and expanding its bilateral and multilateral defence contacts. Japan is increasing its defence diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral security and defence exchanges.

11.4   Japan's military forces are tasked with deterring an armed invasion of Japan and protecting Japan's sea lanes of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles from its shores. The security treaty with the US provides for US assistance in the event of a large-scale invasion and allows Japan to rely on the US nuclear deterrent against any nuclear threat. With a defence budget the world's second largest (reflecting high procurement and labour costs), Japan maintains substantial, modern defence forces that are surpassed in quality and capability in the region only by US forces. But it pays due regard to regional and its own population's sensitivities by eschewing power projection capabilities.

11.5   Japan is showing an increasing interest in being involved in UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world. It is the second largest cash contributor to UN peacekeeping operations (after the US) but has hitherto been wary of committing Japanese military personnel. Nevertheless, since 1992 it has participated with non-combat personnel in six international peacekeeping operations (in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Rwanda and the Golan Heights). In recent months Japanese military aircraft lifted supplies from Surabaya to refugee camps in West Timor.

11.6   Japan's problem with peacekeeping is the UN's increasing authorisation of peacekeepers to carry weapons and to use Chapter 7 force in carrying out their mandate. That conflicts with Japan's legislative prohibition on participating in UN peacekeeping operations which involve peace enforcement, and its Five Principles (which, amongst others, require minimum use of weapons in self defence only). Plans to debate the lifting of the ban on full participation in peacekeeping operations have been put on hold due to opposition within the governing coalition. Japan will remain constrained in its military contribution to international peacekeeping until its current policy is altered.

11.7   While reservations about Japan pursuing a more active military role abroad will continue to be expressed, we do not expect that to result in Japan leaving the US alliance or significantly downgrading its current defence profile. There is a growing body of opinion in Japan, which favours a more independent role for Japan in regional security. But, for the time being, we do not expect Japan to alter the direction of its policies, embracing neither disarmament nor a significant expansion of its military capacity.

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