8.    SOUTH ASIA

8.1   Most of the strategic energies of South Asia are directed inward. While India sees itself as an aspirant great power, particularly vis à vis China, its fundamental concern is with Pakistan. And that sentiment is reciprocated in Islamabad. This limits the impact of India's involvement in East and Southeast Asia. India is unlikely soon to be a significant naval power in the Indian Ocean, although any changes to its military profile there will be of concern to other coastal states.

8.2   The strategic competition between India and Pakistan acquired a new edge with the nuclear tests of 1998. Both countries have now moved on towards the development of nuclear-armed forces. Neither country is likely to accept any rollback of its nuclear capability. Pakistan probably sees its nuclear forces as the ultimate guarantor of the country's security. India is still in the process of developing its doctrine, including what appear to be plans for a triad of nuclear forces. For India, nuclear weapons are at least as much a matter of national prestige as of national security. They are also intended to achieve parity with China as a regional power.

8.3   India's self-proclamation of its nuclear status has enhanced its international standing. India is becoming a more important factor in the strategic calculations of the US, China, Southeast Asia and Australia. India has been visited by the presidents of China (1996) and the US (2000, the first time since 1978). Pakistan may find itself more isolated as both China and the US develop their relations with India. But such interest is likely to increase international attention on Kashmir. A more Islamist government in Pakistan could react by provoking a crisis in the territory.

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