SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Security is only one element in New Zealand's external interests

• A comprehensive approach is needed to promote our external interests and meet our international responsibilities. This involves a range of foreign policy instruments along with defence.

It remains a violent world. But we can and should help keep the peace.

• There are few things as fundamental for New Zealand foreign policy as a commitment to help keep the peace. Parts of the world are still torn by violence. This means loss of life or a life of misery for far too many. Violence on this scale offends deeply held New Zealand values. As a country committed to act against abuses of basic human rights we have an obligation to play our part in preventing or resolving conflicts within or between states.

We have fundamental commitments under the United Nations Charter

• The UN Charter brings together key parts of the global agenda: fundamental human rights, the rule of international law, the promotion of social progress, friendly and peaceful relations between states and efforts to maintain international peace and security. The UN Charter and associated agreements are keystones in the multilateral system and in our approach to foreign relations. New Zealand has important obligations under these treaties.

We have a strong commitment to non-violent means and peaceful solutions

• Military force is not our method of choice. We shall always prefer to use peaceful means to respond to conflict in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter and fundamental New Zealand values.

We may also have to contemplate use of force - but rarely, and with the greatest reluctance

• Chapter VII of the UN Charter recognises that situations will arise which cannot be resolved by diplomatic or other peaceful means. Timor is a recent example. Collective effort involving the threat or use of force may, occasionally, prove to be the best (or the least bad) option. New Zealand governments will insist on a high threshold for any such decisions.

Defence capabilities are only one element in a broader approach to international security

• A New Zealand commitment to keeping the peace involves a multi-track approach: a commitment to the principles and obligations of the UN Charter; policies which stress peaceful resolution of disputes; collective effort by interested governments; a long-term effort to address the root causes of poverty and conflict; work to support good governance and human rights; use of development assistance; support for international law and legal institutions; and use of various other peace-building instruments, including preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures.

The principle of collective effort underpins multilateral responses to international security problems

• This follows from UN Charter provisions and the requirements of international law. In most situations where New Zealand defence capabilities are used we shall be working with other countries. This means that as a practical matter our decisions on force structure, standards, equipment and so on should emphasise interoperability. This approach - which tends to favour adoption of standards used by the Australia/Britain/Canada/US group - in practice expands rather than narrows our operational flexibility.

The NZDF needs to retain combat capabilities

• We do not want to see New Zealand forces involved in combat. But we will inevitably be asked to make NZDF units available for situations in which they face risk of attack or may need to use force. In some cases we are likely to agree (Timor and Bosnia are recent examples). This requires a defence force that is structured, equipped and trained for a combat role. Lack of such capabilities would narrow the range of scenarios in which a New Zealand government would have the option of making a contribution.

We have a track record of using defence resources in good causes

• Our track record over several decades underlines the value of the contribution New Zealand diplomatic and defence capabilities can make to the resolution of conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Our achievements have been out of proportion to our size. Our policy assets include consistent principles, good relationships and independence of approach. At a practical level the defence units we have deployed have proved to be highly effective in supporting our wider external objectives in line with New Zealand values.

The core NZDF responsibility is protection of New Zealand's sovereign interests. But regional and global roles are more important when it comes to decisions on capabilities and force structure.

• Protection of New Zealand sovereignty will continue to require defence force capability and effort. The most fundamental requirement is monitoring what is happening in our immediate area of interest - essentially a maritime surveillance task. We shall have a continuing need to support resource protection in the EEZ, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica and to provide support for civil authorities in areas such as search and rescue, civil defence, crime and illegal migration. A counter-terrorist capability will continue to be required.

• Providing options for responding to a variety of emergencies in the South Pacific should be a basic determinant of defence force structure and capabilities. The New Zealand public, our neighbours in the region and the wider international community will expect us to take a leading role. These military capabilities will also allow us to assist in such areas as disaster relief, search and rescue and surveillance of South Pacific EEZs.

• There is a history of joint effort with Australia on security issues within the region and further afield. We have many interests in common. The high level of co-operation at operational level is an important asset in terms of New Zealand national goals. This has been demonstrated in Cambodia, Bougainville and Timor. As both countries confront the costs of new-generation equipment we should keep an open mind on the scope for greater co-operation in areas such as procurement or support. Working with the Australians in such areas could have practical benefits but need not compromise New Zealand independence in terms of policy or operations.

• It is no longer useful to look at a New Zealand role in Southeast Asia in traditional defence alliance terms. But our role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements provides tangible evidence of a New Zealand commitment to stability in the region. Our continuing participation is useful from the perspective of confidence building and preventive diplomacy as well as for broader political reasons.

• A security role in the wider Asia-Pacific region recognises our commitment as a member of the regional community. It contributes to long-term effort to build confidence and stability, responds to regional expectations that New Zealand will play a role, and is part of a broadly-based pursuit of New Zealand interests. Our role should continue to emphasise security relationships and processes, along with disarmament and non-proliferation effort. There will sometimes be peace support tasks such as Cambodia and Timor. Our military capabilities are not particularly important in a regional context, except as a supplement to those of Australia.

• NZDF capabilities will most frequently be used as a contribution to UN and other collective activities in Asia or further afield. These will primarily take the form of peacekeeping, although we have to keep in mind the possibility (as with Timor) of contributing in situations where there is a possibility of combat involvement. Currently New Zealand is engaged in 13 peace support operations ranging from East Timor and Bougainville in our own region to Sierra Leone and Bosnia.

Australian and American expectations raise some special issues

• The Australians have a strong sense of potential threat in the region. They attach higher priority to defence capabilities than we do, put more resources into defence and are concerned about the defence of Australia. They will continue to have high expectations of New Zealand defence funding levels. Regardless of any differences Australians do see defence as an important part of the trans-Tasman relationship. They expect reciprocity. For the Australians, with defence budget pressures of their own, New Zealand capabilities and how well they mesh in with the ADF are significant. We shall sometimes have different perspectives on issues but it is important to stay in close touch. Defence co-operation is also important for wider relationship reasons.

• Times have changed. Militarily the United States may now be the lone superpower. But in most global trouble spots the Americans are reluctant to lead and will help out (eg in Timor) only if there are others to front up and share costs and risks. In general US expectations present fewer difficulties these days: the Americans are natural company on a lot of good causes. But there will be times when we differ: they have a habit of unilateral action and on occasion a narrow view of the US interest. The nuclear issue is now more manageable: constraints remain (naval visits, exercises, friend rather than ally status) but there are plenty of positives in the relationship for both of us.

• In managing relations with the US and Australia a framework which emphasises real capabilities and readiness and which provides stability in defence planning is probably more important than the overall range of NZDF capabilities.

• In the case of Australia we have an alliance-level relationship. There is a long-held expectation and understanding that each country would go to the defence of the other in time of need.

Disarmament and non-proliferation will remain a core challenge for New Zealand international security effort

• Disarmament effort remains a critical element of New Zealand's approach to wider issues of international security. The risks are changing: new technologies are generating fresh risks in the areas of biological and chemical weaponry, and proliferation of nuclear technology is a major threat. Defence policy needs to be supportive and consistent with our disarmament policy. Defence can provide important technical and operational support in some areas.

Threat based planning is not particularly useful for New Zealand

• There are a limited range of tasks the NZDF is required to perform for the protection of New Zealand sovereignty. Beyond that there are potential risks to wider New Zealand interests in the Asia-Pacific region and further afield. But there is no direct "threat" that we can use as a point of reference for decisions on defence resources or capabilities.

Priorities and force structure

• The judgments above do not provide direct answers to issues over level of defence funding or nature of capabilities. The evidence is that we can do some useful things within the current level of resources and with current capabilities, but naturally we might expect to have wider options if there were more resources or better developed capabilities. There is no direct threat to New Zealand or immediate interests that provides an answer. Relationship factors (especially with Australia and the US) are important but do not provide answers to key resource or priority questions.

• Key tests for defence resourcing and capability decisions should be:

• ability to perform core "sovereignty" tasks around New Zealand

• capabilities allowing an effective response to a variety of emergencies in the South Pacific

• capacity to play a constructive role in security relationships and processes in the Asia-Pacific region

• capabilities allowing us to make an effective military contribution to multilateral coalition responses, in our own region or further afield, noting that some (including peacekeeping) may involve a high level of risk

• ability to work effectively with others - and particularly the Australians - in such situations.

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