THE UNITED STATES : NEW ZEALAND INTERESTS

The United States exercises a profound influence over international financial and economic structures and trends affecting New Zealand.

• Its economy, at 25% of global GDP, is the world's largest. Over the past decade its growth rate has averaged 2.5%.

• United States market trends strongly affect trends in other markets, including New Zealand.

• United States commercial and technological dynamism is a spur to development world-wide. It is driving e-commerce and the information revolution. A high proportion of the major multinational companies are based there.

• In 1999 the United States took 13.8% of our exports (NZ$ 3,105m) and supplied 16.6% of our imports (NZ$ 4,500m).

• Despite inconsistencies and lapses, the US free trade philosophy, and the progressive opening-up of the US market, have been central to post-war trade liberalisation. This has been fundamentally important to New Zealand as a small trading nation outside a major regional trade bloc.

• Further development of the international trading system to secure fairer treatment for agricultural products and to accommodate a new generation of trade issues (services, intellectual property, electronic commerce) will hinge on the US strategy and input.

United States policies and culture are strongly influential in other parts of the world.

• The United States model of a democratic government, a market economy and a pluralist society has affected the direction of development in many other countries.

• Aspects of United States culture, including films and music, shape international standards and cultural norms.

The United States is in military terms the world's sole superpower.

• Following the end of the Cold War, the United States is unrivalled in its global reach and in the extent and range of its military capabilities.

• The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has given it a capacity for military intervention that is targeted and relatively low-risk for its own forces.

The way the United States exercises its global influence may not always be in accord with New Zealand's interests or perceptions of what is desirable internationally.

• The United States is a global power, with global interests, which may lead it in directions other than those suggested by our own more narrow interests.

• As a major power the United States often finds it expedient to deal bilaterally, rather than take a broader range of national interests into account.

• The United States is reluctant to cede sovereignty to international institutions. It at times asserts extraterritorial application of its laws.

• There are constraints on the Executive's freedom of action in international affairs imposed particularly by domestic political imperatives reflected in the attitudes of Congress. The United States lacks a broadly-based whole of government strategy for dealing with the rest of the world.

On many issues there is a natural affinity of interest between New Zealand and the United States.

• The United States favours democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, environmental protection, an open trading system.

• Such objectives, combined with a free and open media and active public debate supported by effective NGO groups, mean that the United States will be to the fore internationally on many issues which we also support.

• Given its international clout, the United States will often exercise deciding influence. New Zealand has to accept that fact, and seek opportunities to make common cause or to bring the United States closer to our point of view.

Implications for New Zealand Security Policy

US nuclear policies have evolved considerably over the past decade.

• There have been decisions to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons, to remove nuclear weapons from all US Navy vessels except ballistic missile submarines, to cease testing and to reduce weapon stocks.

• The US has been active in promoting non-proliferation, through its efforts in relation to countries like Iraq and the DPRK, its response to testing in India and Pakistan, and its investment in stockpile management in the former USSR.

Nevertheless, the US is still a long way from embracing a full disarmament agenda.

• The United States continues to rely upon nuclear deterrence, and to deploy strategic nuclear weapons.

• For the time being the Senate has rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A potentially destabilising National Missile Defence system is under active consideration.

The challenge for New Zealand is to work with the United States to accelerate progress towards disarmament objectives.

• Multilateral initiatives such as the New Agenda initiative offer a means of bringing pressure to bear on all nuclear states to take further steps towards disarmament.

• Through its statements and by contributing to any necessary preventative measures New Zealand should play its part in opposing nuclear proliferation.

• Disarmament and arms control are areas of high sensitivity for the United States; New Zealand should pursue its disarmament agenda steadfastly, but in a way that does not unnecessarily provoke disagreement.

The United States still sees New Zealand's nuclear policies as an unresolved aspect of the defence relationship.

• Despite the decision to remove nuclear weapons from USN vessels, New Zealand's ban on nuclear-propelled ships means that there remains what Washington regards as a fundamental impediment to the US Navy accessing our ports.

• The United States will maintain the position that New Zealand is a friend rather than an ally, and will maintain a range of restrictions on defence co-operation.

• The ANZUS treaty still exists. Although it has ceased to be a point of reference for the NZ/US security relationship, it remains important to Australia as the formal vehicle for the Australia-United States alliance.

• Differences over port access mean that there is at present no prospect of reactivating the treaty as it applies to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States.

• The status of the treaty is not a matter of current debate in New Zealand, and there is nothing to be gained by revisiting it at this stage.

• In very many instances when New Zealand considers it appropriate to commit defence forces overseas, it will be as part of a coalition force that includes also the United States. The most recent example is East Timor.

• It will often not be possible to mount an effective coalition operation, without United States participation. A good working relationship with the United States is therefore an important aspect of New Zealand's capacity to contribute effectively to the resolution of international security issues.

• How defence relationships develop will depend in part on the level of New Zealand's defence spending, and the extent to which New Zealand is willing to commit military resources to deployments (eg in the Middle East) which the United States considers important.

A good working relationship includes the greatest possible level of interoperability with United States forces.

• In situations of actual or potential conflict we are likely to find the United States contributing key assets such as core force elements, communication, logistical support and intelligence. The ability to operate routinely with United States forces will be significant in determining how effectively New Zealand can contribute in such situations, and how safely.

• The forces of other countries with which we are likely to combine will also tend to rely upon equipment that is either of US origin or built to US/NATO standards. This reinforces the desirability of interoperability with the US.

• Much of our own current equipment is of US origin. For reasons of cost and technical requirements (as well as the desirability of interoperability) this is likely to continue to be the case for future procurements.

In the interests of maximising the effectiveness of our contribution to global security needs, and the safety of our forces, it is to our advantage to build up defence co-operation with the United States as much as possible, notwithstanding continuing constraints at the Washington end.

• It is an acceptable position to be a friend not an ally. New Zealand should maintain a close relationship and seek to be helpful and positive where our views and interests coincide.

• We have to accept that there will be issues upon which we do not agree, and that the unilateral tendencies of the United States will at times place them at odds with our own multilateral outlook.

• At the same time we must accept that the United States will often be the key element in the international community's ability to respond effectively to a particular security crisis.

• Recent experience (over the cancellation of the F16 contract) has demonstrated a United States capacity to understand and accept the practical considerations underlying a variation in defence policy. The United States is nevertheless capable of misreading decisions in other capitals. It is in our interest to make a special effort to ensure it reads correctly future New Zealand decisions on defence policy or specific procurement options.

• The weight New Zealand is prepared to give to 'relationship' considerations in defence decisions will be one factor that influences how the United States approaches the defence relationship from its side.

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