SOUTH PACIFIC

Stressed societies in the South Pacific present serious risks

• The problems confronting many island states in the South Pacific - failing governance and infrastructure, marginal economic viability, ethnic and demographic stress - collectively represent a major challenge for New Zealand policy.

Their problems are liable to become our problems

• Because of proximity and strong links with the New Zealand community any major issues in these countries are likely to affect us. New Zealand governments will not have the option of looking the other way.

• The past two decades have seen a series of emergencies in the region which have called for intensive political and diplomatic management from New Zealand governments, usually working with Australian counterparts, and have in some cases carried major economic and security risks. Current trends are not good. We should assume that there are further problems to come.

There are also opportunities for us in the region

• The South Pacific is a key part of New Zealand's heritage. We have extensive commercial interests. There are high levels of trade, with potential for further growth. Air travel has already had a big impact on previously isolated islands in the region. The information revolution has the potential for even greater impact, bringing isolated communities into contact with the world and opening up opportunities in areas such as education, communication and electronic commerce.

• The Pacific connection is an important factor in New Zealand diplomacy. Northern hemisphere capitals look to us for expertise and leadership on Pacific affairs. We commit a large proportion of our diplomatic resources to representation in the region. We are active in regional institutions. The Pacific caucus (now numbering 13 members) is now a key element in our UN diplomacy. The greater part of our ODA effort is committed to the South Pacific.

The South Pacific will remain, for better or for worse, a key factor in our external relations.

• The combination of proximity, community links, diplomatic and economic interests, humanitarian concerns and expectations of other governments means that the South Pacific will remain a central feature of our external relations as far ahead as we can see.

• We have constitutional obligations in respect of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau which extend to aspects of external relations and security.

The South Pacific in New Zealand's security policy

The region has seen troubled times in the 1980s and 90s

• There have been a series of emergencies in the South Pacific over the past two decades. Several occasions have involved major civil violence and bloodshed (PNG, Bougainville, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia). Evacuation of New Zealanders and other expatriates has been an issue on several occasions. There have been expectations in the region and further afield that Australia and New Zealand would carry the main burden of response or assistance.

We can expect further trouble in the period ahead

• Given current indicators there is a strong prospect of further emergencies on the pattern of the 1980s and 1990s. On top of this, we can expect major natural disasters which will demand New Zealand assistance and require deployment of military resources and capabilities.

The Canberra connection remains critical

• The Australians will remain key players. We shall need to work closely with them, bearing in mind that any emergency is liable to involve us both. And we want to have a full input into policy debate in Canberra at such times, bearing in mind the scope for differences of perspective on some issues.

The problems of the region demand a multitrack approach

• New Zealand policy will be to continue to use all available means to avert further security crises. We shall want to:
  • maintain a long-term strategy for supporting economic development, with associated good governance

  • keep up an active role in South Pacific institutions such as the Forum and encourage collective solutions to region-wide problems

  • make full use of NZODA resources - and encourage governments outside the region to maintain support for island states

  • use our diplomatic resources to help develop political solutions to internal problems
  • use military assets peacefully where that is important and useful (Bougainville etc)
  • use military programmes (defence co-operation, New Zealand military assistance programmes) in ways that encourage military and paramilitary forces in the region to operate constitutionally - and help develop security capabilities appropriate to regional needs.

South Pacific capabilities have to be a core requirement for the NZDF

• In terms of New Zealand interests it is important that New Zealand governments have military options available to respond to South Pacific emergencies. Situations we could face include:
  • collapse of civil authority leading to unchecked violence (this has long been the nightmare for PNG)

  • a need to evacuate or protect New Zealand and other expatriates placed at risk by a civil emergency

  • a request from a friendly government for assistance for protection in the face of threatened overthrow by force (as in Vanuatu in 1988) or to help control civil violence

  • a request to provide peace brokering or peacekeeping assistance (Bougainville and Solomon Islands being examples).

• In the more difficult scenarios we would be extremely wary of military involvement beyond protection of New Zealand citizens (Fiji in 1987 was a good illustration). But the New Zealand public will as a minimum expect that resources currently going into defence will provide the option of responding to a regional emergency. Although most scenarios would involve combined Australian and New Zealand effort it is also important that New Zealand have some independent capacity.

Several conclusions relating to NZDF capabilities flow from these judgments

• The capabilities highlighted in recent debate on defence priorities (army capabilities and associated naval and air support, including maritime surveillance) would form the core of a New Zealand response in most South Pacific scenarios that could be imagined.

• Ability to perform core military tasks in the South Pacific should be a primary point of reference for future NZDF capability

  development.

• The NZDF will also be expected to provide support for resource protection activities, search and rescue, disaster relief and development assistance.

• Interoperability and close operational links with the Australian Defence Force, along with complementary capabilities, will remain essential.

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