-
(i)
- The Framework
-
48.
- Changing the way in which an organisation is structured is not a panacea for real or perceived failure to deliver at an optimal level.2 However, poor structure can blur an organisation's focus on its goals, inhibit its ability to pick up signals from its stakeholders, reduce the speed and quality of its decision making, including the use of resources, and frustrate the people who work in it.
-
49.
- Good people will always find a way to work around poor structure, but they should not have to. Considering change to structure within the context of an organisation's strategy should be an ongoing process rather that an intermittent, possibly wrenching, event. Put another way, developing and implementing an organisational strategy, whether in the public or private sectors, is an integral part of the life of an organisation, and like all other aspects, the organisation's structure must be constantly reviewed to ensure it contributes to (or at least does not inhibit) the organisation's effectiveness in achieving its goals. Structure should follow strategy, or, in a static sense, form follows function.3
-
50.
- It is also incumbent upon the New Zealand Police to constantly improve efficiency, and its initiatives in this are touched on elsewhere in this report. Organisational structure has an obvious impact on this, but again, the context must be recognised - designing an organisational structure for New Zealand Police must take account of the legislative/governance environment (statutory responsibilities), the Policing Strategy (effectiveness), the normal State Sector/Police Finance Act ownership responsibilities (efficiency), and the current structure (transition costs).
-
51.
- In a crude sense, this includes balancing strategic capability (the ability to deliver, including in response to rare and/or unexpected demands), with operational excellence (the no-waste, efficient "machine"). This, of course, is the challenge faced by all organisations.
-
(ii)
- How the Structure of New Zealand Police Was Reviewed
-
52.
- The organisational structure of the New Zealand Police was reviewed within the context of the overall review. The analysis and design work built on an intensive amount of work already undertaken by a Police Structures Working Party. The review goal was set by the review's Terms of Reference, but, in a more fundamental sense, by the Government's Strategic Result Areas and the Policing Strategy discussed elsewhere in this report.
-
53.
- A set of "Operating Assumptions for Structures and Service Delivery" was identified and refined throughout the review to guide the design work. These are appended as Appendix 3. In addition, "Key Principles" were identified to guide the design of the Commissioner's Office, which are also appended in Appendix 3. Both the "Assumptions" and "Key Principles" are a mixture of high-level and second-order criteria that fall into the two broad factors of:
- strategic capability; and
- operational excellence
-
54.
- "Strategic capability" relates to the New Zealand Police's; capability to deliver on its strategic goals, and encompasses:
- thinking strategically;
- ability to manage risk; and
- flexibility and innovation;
-
55.
- The organisational structure must foster and maintain strategic thinking: indirectly by enabling information flows externally (information exchange with stakeholders), and internally ie. ensuring strategy takes account of "coalface" reality, and equally, that those on the frontline are working in concert with the overall strategy; and directly, by maintaining some resource focused on strategic development. It must harness the ideas and initiatives of the highly trained, experienced, frontline staff.
-
56.
- Risk assessment must be ongoing to ensure the maintenance of a reasonable capability to act and react to policing situations. Like strategic thinking, this must be in integral to policing at all levels.
-
57.
- Given the nature of the Policing Strategy, the speed of change in society generally and of new technology, the challenge to New Zealand Police is to ensure the fluid nature of the strategy process in reflected in flexibility and innovation.
-
58.
- Finally, along with the expectation that everyone in New Zealand Police must contribute to strategy is the necessity of giving "managers" and constables maximum leeway to both do this and deliver policing services. This in turn requires clear and robust accountability mechanisms.
-
59.
- "Operational excellence" relates to the New Zealand Police's efficiency, and encompasses:
- "customer focus";
- quality of service;
- the freedom of the Commissioner and other "managers" to manage resources efficiently;
- cost minimisation
- the number and nature of direct reports (span of control) to the Commissioner and other "managers";
- transparency of decision making; and
- clear lines of accountability and no duplication of functions.
-
60.
- "Customer focus" to the New Zealand Police means understanding the needs and expectations of its customers and delivering services that meet or exceed their needs and expectations. This involves positioning all Police officers and the organisation to understand the needs of the public, Iwi, and Government. It requires all New Zealand Police staff to have the skills to deliver a quality service to their customers and work in partnership with them to achieve their vision of Safer Communities Together.
-
61.
- Empowering the Commissioner and other "managers" to manage resources efficiently and to minimise costs is a dimension of the accountability mechanism referred to under "strategic capability", as are the other factors of a reasonable number of direct reports (span of control) to the Commissioner (and other "managers") - this of course is heavily influenced by nature of the activity undertaken by the direct reports, but, in any case, requires sound management information systems - transparency of decision making, and clear lines of accountability and no duplication of functions.
- (iii)
- The Preferred Option
-
62.
- In developing an organisational structure, two polar extremes in terms of approach are possible - developing and testing a wide range of options against established criteria, or an iterative approach using the criteria to build a preferred option. This review adopted an approach somewhere in the middle, but closest to the latter.
-
63.
- As noted, the design work on the preferred option described below was conducted in the context of the overall review and cannot be seen in isolation from it - for example, the review of property management led to conclusions impacting on the organisational structure, and the section on Property Management discusses some detail in this regard.
-
64.
- The design of the preferred option was driven by a tight focus on:
- maintenance of a strategic capability to ensure delivery of the Policing Strategy (effectiveness); and
- core policing competencies (efficiency).
-
65.
- It has the following key characteristics:
- devolution of responsibility to the lowest competent level, with concomitant robust accountability mechanisms;
- empowerment of the frontline and Districts to the maximum degree possible (a dimension of devolution);
- streamlined reporting lines including:
-
- the elimination of the regional office layer and other layers of hierarchy consistent with other factors such as reasonable span of control; and
- direct links between Districts and the Commissioner and senior officers/managers;
- an emphasis on frontline delivery, with national/interregional, and support services being provided on an internal contracting basis ("service level agreements" akin to those found in many public sector agencies);
- national/interregional services (eg. monitoring of gang behaviour) grouped into "service centres";
- a small Commissioner's office focused on support for the Minister, Commissioner, and, for strategic advice to districts; and
- a three-pronged approach to support services:
-
- districts being resourced to manage most support services in a day-to- day sense (with an emphasis on "managers" assuming greater responsibility in accordance with increased devolution, and district support staff, such as human resource advisers, providing advice and assistance rather than having line responsibility);
- the Commissioner's office retaining strategic oversight of support services; and
- services outside of policing core competencies being outsourced (see the section on Outsourcing).
-
66.
- The preferred option for the national organisational structure is:
-
Comment
67. - The preferred option would see a major change from the status quo:
- enhanced relationship (communication and accountability) between the key "players" responsible for managing service delivery, by direct reporting lines between the Commissioner and District "Managers";
- role of District "Managers" will enhanced by this relationship, with their performance agreements being linked directly to KRAs;
- the Office of the Commissioner becomes a small, multi-skilled unit focused on supporting the Minister, Commissioner and Districts; and
- District Offices will combine skilled management support teams focused on best practice performance.
-
68.
- The District "Managers", together with the Commissioner and other senior staff, would form an Operating Committee, which would focus on the efficient and effective delivery of outputs to achieve the Government's public safety objectives. It would also develop a strategy to manage major security events such as APEC. The Committee would constantly monitor the support services necessary to fulfil the District's obligations, and would provide a forum for cross fertilisation of ideas.
-
69.
- The Service Centre concept would see a number of national/support services grouped and providing services to Districts (and, for, say, management information, to the Commissioner's Office) via a direct purchase contract.
The services could include:
- communications
- traffic safety
- forensic
- prosecutions
- licensing
- HR support (eg. payroll)
- training
- finance (non-strategic accounting services)
- stores
- INCIS
- IT
-
70.
- How the services could be configured into groups would need further work - one possibility is to divide them into those relating to policing capability (eg forensic), and those related to more generic processing functions (eg. payroll). Some functions may be suitable for outsourcing.
-
71.
- The preferred option for a typical District office is:
Comment
-
72.
- The map indicates 11 Districts, a reduction from the current 16. Arguments can be mounted for a range of numbers of District offices, but 11 was preferred taking into account:
- the elimination of the regional structure;
- natural communities/geographical boundaries; and
- reasonable span of control - both in terms of manageability for the District "manager", and in terms of direct reports to the Commissioner.
-
73.
- Whilst not addressed on the preceding diagrams, the rationalisation of the number of Districts would also suggest a reduction in the number of Areas/Groups (the next and final management unit below the District level) from 57 to 48 - or 4 to 5 per District "manager".
-
74.
- Each District Office would have about 11 staff, with the possibility of slightly more in major cities. The "template" in the proceeding diagram could be varied to meet local needs, but would broadly reflect:
Business Development
Strategy, managing change, policy, communications, Iwi and partnerships.
Crime Services
Major investigations, squads, specialists and forensic
Human Resources
Non-sworn HR specialist
Business Services
Non-sworn financial specialist, contracts, assets, administration and corporate planning
Operational Services
District traffic and operational units, intelligence, professional standards
In metropolitan Districts, the following may also be included:
Emergency Response
The preferred option for the Commissioner's Office is:
Comment
-
75.
- The Office of the Commissioner exists to support the Minister, the Commissioner, and the Districts. The broad roles for each function on the diagram are described below:
Policy and Liaison, and Public Affairs
- assisting Commissioner set national direction of organisation
defining strategies to support the national goals
- ensure activities are coordinated with other sector partners
- provide input into the national policy development process
- ensure there is clear communication with all stakeholders
Resource Management Group
- provide a sound organisational framework to ensure an efficient and effective use of resources;
- provide guidance and support to District and Area Managers to assist them in exercising their functions;
- administer those services centralised in order to achieve economies of scale eg. payroll and accounts; and
- provide advice on complying with legislative and central agency requirements. Policing Development: Co-ordination of research and project management.
Operations
- national and international intelligence clearing house;
- tactical and specialist services eg. Communications Centres; Forensic;
- Co-ordination and Management of National Operations;
- Peer Review and Quality Assurance of major District Investigations;
- Management of special events (APEC) or special investigations ; and
- Separate Prosecutions (consistent with Law Commission recommendation).
Audit and Performance Management
- Undertakes compliance and Internal Audit functions; and
- Reviews organisational effectiveness eg. thematic reviews on District initiatives with local Iwi.
- (iv)
- Analysis
-
76.
- What follows is a summary analysis of the status quo, a divisional structure, and the preferred option.
-
Status Quo
-
77.
- Given the Terms of Reference and the other review recommendations, the status quo is not an option, but summarising the analysis of it links the issue identification specifically to the current organisational structure.
-
78.
- The current structure clearly contributes to some of the New Zealand Police's weaknesses. The structure is an awkward mix of a many-layered hierarchy, matrix management, and vertical "pillars" of services. Combined (and, arguably, each component on their own), they may inhibit and compartmentalise strategic thinking. The overall strategy may not always be clear to those on the frontline.
-
79.
- The risk of dissipated accountability inherent in a matrix management model, and the risk of "patch protection" inherent in "pillars", do not aid risk assessment at the strategic level, and the consequent prioritisation of resources. These components, and especially the many layers of the hierarchy4, inhibit flexibility and innovation. Management autonomy at the middle management level is in many respects illusory given the many input controls.
-
80.
- The structure does provide for "command" responses necessary in the policing environment, but the question remains about the degree to which a clearer, simple structure would allow "middle managers" to maintain a strategic capability within their area of responsibility.
-
81.
- The weak "feedback loop" in relation to external stakeholders referred to above, coupled with the relative lack of autonomy of "middle managers", sits uncomfortably with the Policing Strategy, and community policing in particular - in short, there are obstacles to "client focus".
-
82.
- As noted, there is room to increase "manager" autonomy, and allow them to make resource trade-offs that best suit their area of responsibility to maintain strategic capability and minimise cost.
-
83.
- Also as noted, the current hierarchal/matrix/"pillar" hybrid structure means decision making is emphatically not transparent to staff not directly involved in the process, nor to external stakeholders. This issue of clear lines of accountability is a dimension of transparency in this context. The relative lack of accountability of "managers" means where the "buck stops" for a given issue is not always clear to those at a lower level in the organisation (or to external stakeholders). This is exacerbated by the matrix component.
-
84.
- Finally, the hierarchy, coupled with the regional structure and the functions located in them, strongly suggest duplication of functions.
-
Divisional Model
-
85.
- A "divisional" model was considered in the early stages of the design work. This would entail a Commissioner's Office responsible for governance, goal-setting and monitoring, and other corporate functions, and two or more national divisions each focused on a particular function, eg. traffic; or divisions based on outputs. This model could be compared to the holding/subsidiary company model in the private sector, or a number of Public Service departments such as Social Welfare and Labour.
-
86.
- However, several factors quickly ruled out detailed consideration of this model:
- the Policing Strategy, particularly the concept of community policing, rests on devolution of responsibilities to the lowest competent level;
- the Constable is at the frontline and, as discussed, has a wide brief within statutory parameters. Put in conventional terms, Constables and the supervisory/management positions of Sergeant and Senior Sergeant are multi-skilled positions of significant authority and responsibility. They are required, over time, to operate across the full range of policing activities. They reflect, at the level of the individual, the flexible nature of frontline policing where resources are deployed across a wide range of duties. Reinforcing organisational "pillars" by adopting a divisional structure would introduce an organisational obstacle to this flexibility.
-
Preferred Option
-
87.
- The preferred option will enhance the New Zealand Police's strategic capability to achieve the Government's higher order strategic policing direction. The centrality of strategic thinking will be reinforced by:
- the refocussing of the Commissioner's Office on the Governments strategic direction and monitoring of the performance in terms of the Policing Strategy of the districts and the service centres;
- enhanced, "built-in" links between the Commissioner' Office and the "coalface" by streamlining the lines of accountability;
- the expectation of strategic thinking on the part of all Police staff inherent in maximum devolution. This, combined with better links to the Commissioner's Office, will also enhance external information flows; and
- maintenance of a strategic policy resource in the Commissioner's Office.
-
88.
- Risk assessment will be enhanced by the same mechanisms as for strategic thinking - maximising information flows and input to strategy - but in the context of sharpened accountability (see below).
-
89.
- Flexibility and innovation will be encouraged by the devolved nature of the preferred option.
-
90.
- Accountability will be sharpened by the reduction in layers of hierarchy and the shift in focus from matrix management to collegiality. That is, district and service centre "managers" accountability in their area of responsibility will be clearly-defined. They will also be required to contribute collegially to the overall direction of the New Zealand Police in a direct sense by virtue of reporting directly to the Commissioner. Managers and staff in the Commissioner's Office will have a clear focus on the strategic, with delivery to be primarily by the districts and service centres.
-
91.
- The separation of prosecutions from the districts - in effect, a separate organisational "pillar" - reflects the distinct nature of their role and competencies (they are not Constables), and implements the recent recommendations of the Law Commission. They were the exception to prove the rule.
-
92.
- The preferred option will also enhance the operational excellence of the New Zealand Police. Districts and service centres will be charged, within an overall strategy that they will be part of determining, with delivering the policing strategy in the way best sorted to their area of responsibility. "Client focus" is central to that strategy, and so to the operations of the districts and service centres. Managers will be held accountable for demonstrating "client focus" and high quality services.
-
93.
- Empowering the Commissioner and other "managers" to manage resources efficiently and minimise costs is inherent in the devolved/sharpened accountability nature of the preferred option.
-
94.
- The preferred option involves a reasonable span of control, both in terms of areas of responsibility, and the number of direct reports. The former is enhanced by the clear definition of, and accountability for, areas of responsibility, and contractual (service level agreement) arrangements between districts and service centres (and outsourced services). When considering what is reasonable in terms of the number of direct reports, it is important to keep in mind that this is heavily influenced by the nature of those direct reports ie the Commissioner - district "manager" relationship will be managed in the context of a set of clear, measurable performance measures, and specialist advisers in the Commissioner's Office. Having district "managers", the two Deputy Commissioners, and specialist advisers, reporting directly to the Commissioner is possible with 11 districts, and with "corporate" service functions reporting through a direct report to the Commissioner. This model is replicated at the district level - the focus on the core policing function emphasised by area "managers" reporting directly to the district "manager", with business/support services grouped.
-
95.
- Transparency of service making, clear lines of accountability, and no duplication of functions are clearly all enhanced by the preferred option for the reasons cited in relation to and accountability abuse.
- (v)
- Staffing of Preferred Option
-
96.
- Allocating staff numbers to a redesigned organisation is, in the end, a matter of judgement rather than a precise science. However, the key criteria referred to in the analysis of options earlier provide a guide. For example, the strategic focus of the Commissioner's Office clearly points to a small entity akin to such offices in many public and private sector organisations. Other criteria were also applied, such as a ratio of one NCO Supervisor to 5 Constables as a sound supervision ratio for Police.
-
97.
- As noted in the Introduction, the review team welcomes comment on the tentative staffing figures outlined below:
|
Commissioner's Office
|
- Commissioner
- 145 positions
|
|
District Management and Support Staff
|
- 128
|
- (vi)
- Staffing Reductions Generated by Preferred Options
-
98.
- The frontline is not affected. By refocussing the Commissioner's Office and streamlining the hierarchy, staff reductions can be broadly identified as follows:
|
|
Sworn |
Non-Sworn |
Total |
|
Commissioner's Office |
35 |
80 |
115 |
|
Regional Offices |
25 |
50 |
75 |
|
District Office |
55 |
200 |
255 |
|
Total |
115 |
330 |
445 |
-
99.
- Pursuing outsourcing of non-core services, and the practical establishment of the service centres, may also lead to fewer staff being required.
- (vii)
- Financial Savings From Staff Reductions in Preferred Options
-
100.
- The estimated savings in direct personal costs generated by the staff reductions of the preferred option is of the order of $24 million. This figure assumes pay and related costs of $60,000 per position for the Districts, and in the case Commissioner's Office is broadly based or actual salary bands.
|
