-
41.
- Policing is a core function of the State, and as such the New Zealand Police, as an organisation closely resembles a Public Service department. As described in Parts C and D, a number of the practices and processes adopted in the State sector for assigning accountabilities also apply to the New Zealand Police, most notably:
-
(i)
- the contribution of the New Zealand Police to the Government's Strategic Result Areas is specified, and given operational effect through the six Key Result Areas;
-
(ii)
- leading from (i), the Commissioner of Police and the Minister negotiate an annual Purchase Agreement specifying the amount and quality of the outputs to be delivered by the New Zealand Police. The Purchase Agreement is reasonably specific, and does create the potential for the Minister to alter law enforcement priorities consistent with the limits on Ministerial direction incorporated in the Memoranda of Understanding between the Minister and the Commissioner; and
-
(iii)
- the financial accountabilities and associated reporting requirements specified in the Public Finance Act apply to the New Zealand Police.
-
42.
- Notwithstanding, the New Zealand Police is distinguishable from a Public Service department in a number of respects.
-
(i)
- the power of the Minister of Police to direct the Commissioner is constrained by the Commissioner's original and independent statutory authority on law enforcement. The precise limits on the Minister 's powers are difficult to define, and amount to a distinction between Government policy and Police operations.
It is clear that the Minister cannot direct the Commissioner in criminal law enforcement, either in particular cases, on in classes of cases. The Minister can, however, impose binding requirement in respect of administration and resources.
-
(ii)
- the difficulty in precisely defining the boundary between Government policy and Police operations has the effect of diluting the accountability of the Commissioner and the New Zealand Police, and has meant that the responsibilities of the Commissioner and the New Zealand Police have been defined in the broadest of terms only.
-
(iii)
- whilst some parts of the State Sector Act regime apply to the New Zealand Police, others do not, most notably, the appointment processes for Chief Executives, and the procedures for reviewing the performance of Chief Executives.
-
43.
- The New Zealand Police manage assets of very substantial value, including a significant property portfolio. The main risk associated with owning these assets is that of ensuring that the assets are continuously assessed to ensure that they meet the needs of the New Zealand Police.
-
44.
- A thorough analysis of the constitutional issues involving the New Zealand Police is contained in Appendix 1. The analysis focuses on the central issue of how to strengthen the accountability of the Commissioner and the Police consistent with their constitutional independence on law enforcement. Two broad approaches are identified, namely, a strengthening and extension of the current accountability arrangements contained in the Police Act and the State Sector Act, and a Management Board which exercises powers over resources and administration and holds the Commissioner to account for the effective and an efficient management of resources.
-
45.
- On balance, the former approach is favoured because it does not offend the constitutional independence of the Commissioner. An externally appointed Board analogous to a Board of Directors or a Commission, with powers over resources and administration, has the potential to create real tensions around the issues of constitutional independence. Such tensions are best addressed through a direct relationship between the Minister and the Commissioner. However, as discussed below, there may well be advantages in a Ministerially appointed Advisory Board to advise on the management of the Crowns ownership risk in the New Zealand Police.
-
46.
- The existing accountability arrangements could be strengthened and extended in a variety of ways:
-
(i)
- whilst it is not possible to clearly define the line between Government policy and New Zealand Police operations, it is possible to make its workings more transparent. This could be achieved by amending the Police Act to allow the Minister of Police to give written directions to the Commissioner, which would be tabled in the House of representatives (see Appendix 1);.
-
(ii)
- the Police Act should be amended to clearly set out its purpose, to define the role of the Police, and to more clearly specify the responsibilities of the Commissioner;
-
(iii)
- the Police Act could be brought more into line with those provisions in the State Sector Act which would enhance accountability including:
- clarification of the appointment process for the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners including issues of tenure and removal;
- empowering the State Services Commissioner to review and report on the performance of the Commissioner of Police;
- requiring the Commissioner of Police to report each year to the Minister on the financial performance of the Police; and
- requiring the Commissioner to furnish a report on the operational components of New Zealand Police activities, and on issues which are subject to Ministerial direction.
-
47.
- The changes suggested above have the effect of more clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the Police Commissioner, and strengthening reporting and review procedures. As such, they are very much "after the event". However, given the magnitude of the Crown's ownership interest in the New Zealand Police, further measures are necessary to properly manage that risk. These could, to an extent, be achieved by the Minister of Police appointing a Management Advisory Board, comprising persons with business skills and experience, to advise the Minister on the New Zealand Police's Corporate intentions, including capital investments and divestments. This advice could also extend to assessing the adequacy of the business practices adopted by the New Zealand Police in managing its resources, and which in turn could feed into the State Service Commissioner's review of the Police Commissioner's performance.
|
